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  Since the mid 1990s, due to a growing trend across countries towards globalization and 
financial integration, banking sectors in many developing countries have experienced some 
important transformations. Key among them has been a rapid increase in the degree of foreign 
bank participation. Between 1995 and 2002, the average share of banking sector assets held by 
foreign banks in 104 developing countries rose from 18 percent to 33 percent.
1  
Many studies have examined the causes and implications of foreign bank participation.
2 
The contribution of this paper is to describe the recent trends in foreign bank ownership in 
developing countries, summarize the existing evidence on the causes and implications of foreign 
bank presence and re-examine the link between banking crises and foreign bank participation. 
Using data on the share of banking sector assets owned by foreign banks in over 100 developing 
countries, we document a strong rise in foreign bank participation in two regions of the world: 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia and Latin America. Foreign bank presence has increased in 
Africa as well, but at a generally slower pace than in the other two regions. By contrast, foreign 
bank participation has remained stagnant or even declined in East and South Asia and in the 
Middle East and North Africa. 
  Our empirical analysis shows that countries that experienced a banking crisis from 1995 
to 2002 tended to have higher levels of foreign bank participation than those that did not. 
Furthermore, panel regressions indicate that foreign bank participation increased as a result of 
crises rather than prior to them. However, post-crisis increases in foreign bank participation did 
not coincide with increased credit to the private sector. We speculate that this is due to the fact 
that in most countries foreign entrants acquired distressed banks with a high share of loans that 
needed to be written off. By contrast, in countries where the level of foreign bank participation 
was relatively high and stable, private credit levels were significantly higher than in other 
countries before, during, and after crises.  
  The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the recent trends in foreign bank 
participation among developing countries. Section 3 reviews the existing literature on the causes 
                                                 
1 These data come from Micco, Panizza, and Yañez (2006). We exclude developed countries and off-shore centers. 
If we take the average over the 72 countries for which information exists for each year between 1995 and 2002, the 
average participation in developing countries is not substantially different. It rose from 17 to 31 percent. 
2 See the literature review in Section 3.   3
and implications of foreign bank participation. Section 4 examines the relationship between 
crises and foreign bank participation in developing countries and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Trends in foreign bank participation 
  Statistics on the average share of banking assets held by foreign banks in developing 
countries over the last decade disguise important regional differences, as well as differences 
within each region. This section describes levels and trends in foreign bank participation across 
regions and also discusses the degree to which recent regional changes in foreign bank 
participation are common to most countries in the region or are driven by only a few exceptions.  
  As shown in Figure 1, between 1995 and 2002 foreign bank participation increased 
primarily in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Latin America, and Sub-Saharan Africa.
3 By 
2002, close to 40 percent of assets in all three regions were in the hands of foreign banks. On the 
other hand, in Asia and in the Middle East and Northern Africa, foreign bank participation 
remained low – close to 10 percent of banking sector assets – and stagnant throughout the period. 
  Even among the three regions where the share of assets held by foreign banks has been 
rising there are some differences both in the levels of foreign bank presence and in the speed 
with which it has increased in recent years. For example, whereas the average level of foreign 
bank participation during 1995-2002 was highest in Sub-Saharan Africa, both the absolute and 
relative increases in the share of assets held by foreign banks have been most significant in 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia and in Latin America. The share of assets held by foreign banks 
in Sub-Saharan Africa rose by 9 percentage points from 30 percent in 1995 to 39 percent in 
2002. This represents a 1.3 times increase. In Eastern Europe and Central Asia the share of assets 
held by foreign banks roughly tripled from almost 13 percent in 1995 to 39 percent in 2002. In 
Latin America, foreign bank participation nearly doubled, going from 19 percent to 37 percent 
over this period.   
  While in Africa, many of the foreign banks have been operating since colonial times, 
entry in Eastern Europe and Latin America has been more recent. Most of the entry of foreign 
banks in Eastern Europe and Central Asia has resulted from the privatization of state-owned 
                                                 
3 Because here we compare averages across regions, to avoid that statistics are affected by changes in the sample 
composition over time, we focus only on countries in each region for which we have data on foreign bank 
participation for every year between 1995 and 2002. This means that we calculate regional averages over a sample 
of 72 countries instead of 104, which is the total number of developing countries for which we have data from 
Micco et al. (2006).   4
banks following the fall of communism in the region. The largest five foreign banks with 
operations in Eastern Europe and Central Asia are KBC Bank (Belgium), Erste Bank (Austria), 
HVB Group (Austria), Société Générale (France) and Unicredito Italiano (Italy). There are 
regional specializations of some foreign banks: large Scandinavian banks like Swedbank and 
Skandinavska Enskilda have the markets of the Baltic States, and Greek banks such National 
Bank of Greece, Piraeus Bank, Alpha Bank, and Emporiki Bank of Greece are present in the 
Balkan countries. At the same time, Austrian banks - Erste Bank, HVB Group and Raiffeisen - 
control large shares of banking assets in most Eastern European and Central Asian countries, 
with the exception of the Baltic States. In Latin America, entry has been driven by foreign bank 
acquisitions of domestic banks. In particular, two Spanish banks – Banco Santander Central 
Hispano and Banco Bilbao Viscaya Argentaria (BBVA) – have been particularly aggressive in 
acquiring banks in the region.
4 However, other non-Spanish banks such as Citibank from the 
U.S. and HSBC from the U.K. also have an important presence in the region. 
  East Asia had the lowest levels of foreign bank participation throughout the period 1995-
2002 and also exhibited the smallest increase. The share of assets held by foreign banks was 
close to 7 percent throughout the entire period. In terms of levels of foreign bank presence, South 
Asia follows East Asia as the region with the lowest levels of foreign bank participation. In 
South Asia, the share of assets held by foreign banks was almost 9 percent in 1995 and rose to 12 
percent in 2000 only to drop to 10 percent by 2002. Finally, foreign bank participation in Middle 
East and North Africa was close to 12 percent in 1995 and rose only to almost 13 percent by 
2002.
5 
  Table 1 presents detailed information on the share of assets held by foreign banks in each 
of 104 developing countries. This allows us to examine more closely whether the regional trends 
described above were driven by most or only some of the countries in each region. In Sub-
Saharan Africa, the increase in foreign bank participation was a fairly widespread phenomenon. 
Foreign bank participation increased in 22 out of the 30 African countries for which we have 
data on foreign bank participation. In absolute terms (i.e., percentage point changes in the share 
of assets held by foreign banks), the increase in foreign bank participation was most significant 
                                                 
4 Banco Santander has operations in 15 Latin American and Caribbean countries, while BBVA is present in 11 
countries in the region. 
5 Algeria, where foreign bank participation averaged 62 percent throughout the period, is a clear outlier in the 
region.    5
in Mozambique and Cote d’Ivoire, where the share of assets held by foreign banks increased by 
over 40 percentage points. In Mozambique, foreign bank participation increased from close to 22 
percent in 1996 to over 72 percent in 2002. In Cote d’Ivoire, foreign bank presence rose from 20 
percent in 1995 to 62 percent in 2002. In relative terms (i.e., with respect to their initial levels of 
foreign bank presence), both Sierra Leone and South Africa experienced significant increases in 
the share of foreign bank participation. In Sierra Leone, the share of assets held by foreign banks 
rose from 0 to over 29 percent and in South Africa it increased from 0.3 to almost 11 percent. On 
the other hand, the share of assets held by foreign banks declined in 6 countries in the region, 
namely: Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Niger, Senegal, and Zimbabwe. In Ethiopia and 
Seychelles, foreign participation did not change. 
  In Eastern Europe and Central Asia, the increase in foreign bank participation observed 
over the last decade was also quite pervasive. Out of 25 countries in the region for which we 
have data on foreign bank participation, the share of assets held by foreign banks increased in 22 
of them.  The increase was particularly spectacular in Lithuania and the Slovak Republic, where 
the share of assets controlled by foreign banks rose by over 70 percentage points. In Lithuania, 
foreign bank participation rose from close to 19 percent in 1995 to over 90 percent in 2002. The 
Slovak Republic witnessed an increase in the share of assets held by foreign banks from 9 to 
almost 82 percent. Relative to the beginning levels of foreign bank presence, Romania also 
experienced a significant increase in foreign bank participation. In this country, the share of bank 
assets held by foreign banks rose from almost 0 to 26 percent in 2002. On the other hand, in 
countries such as Azerbaijan, Serbia, Turkey, and Uzbekistan foreign bank participation 
remained insignificant (0 or close to it) and not changing over the period 1995-2002. 
In Latin America, foreign bank participation increased in 17 out of 23 countries in our 
sample. The increase in foreign bank participation was especially noteworthy in Mexico and 
Uruguay. In Mexico, the share of assets held by foreign banks increased from 2.31 percent in 
1995 to 61.9 in 2002. In Uruguay, foreign bank participation rose from 24 percent to almost 95 
percent in 2002. Ecuador is the only country in the region where foreign bank participation 
dropped significantly. Between 1997 and 2000 the share of assets held by foreign banks 
collapsed from close to 26 percent to almost 0. Countries such as Bolivia, Panama, and Trinidad 
and Tobago also experienced a decline in foreign bank participation between 1995 and 2002, but   6
the drop was much smaller by comparison. In Panama and Bolivia, by 2002, the share of assets 
held by foreign banks still exceeded 40 and 50 percent, respectively. 
  In the Middle East and North Africa region, the share of assets held by foreign banks 
increased significantly only in the case of Oman, where foreign bank participation rose from 0 to 
8 percent of banking sector assets. In Egypt and Tunisia, foreign bank presence rose by less than 
5 percentage points. In the case of Egypt, the share of assets held by foreign banks rose from 4 to 
7 percent and in Tunisia it increased from 11 to 15 percent.  In Lebanon, Morocco, and Yemen 
foreign bank participation declined over the period 1995-2002.  In Yemen, the share of assets 
held by foreign banks dropped from almost 7 to 2 percent. Morocco experienced a drop in 
foreign bank participation from 19 to 16 percent, while in Lebanon the share of assets held by 
foreign banks dropped from 30 to 28 percent. In Iran and Lybia the share of assets held by 
foreign banks remained at zero throughout the period. Finally, Algeria is a clear outlier in the 
region where foreign bank participation averaged 62 percent throughout the period.   
  Nepal and Pakistan were the only two countries in South Asia where foreign bank 
participation increased between 1995 and 2002. In Nepal, the share of assets held by foreign 
banks rose from 38.8 to 45.4 percent. In Pakistan, the increase was smaller. Foreign bank 
participation rose from 1.4 to almost 6 percent. In both India and Sri Lanka, the share of assets 
held by foreign banks dropped between 1995 and 2002. In the case of India, foreign bank 
participation rose from 0.9 in 1995 to 1.7 in 2000, only to fall to 0.6 percent in 2002. In Sri 
Lanka, foreign bank presence dropped from 2-3 percent during 1995-2001 to less than 0.3 
percent by 2002. In the case of Bangladesh, there was no foreign bank presence throughout the 
period 1995-2002. 
  With the exception of Mongolia - where the share of assets held by foreign banks rose 
from 0 to 45 - and to a lesser degree Korea - where  foreign bank participation increased from 2 
to 9 percent - in most other countries in East Asia, the share of assets held by foreign banks 
remained constant or declined over the period 1995-2002. In the case of Indonesia, the share of 
foreign bank assets averaged close to 4 percent throughout the period 1995-2002. Foreign bank 
participation stood at 23-26 percent in Malaysia, 8-9 percent in the Philippines and 7-10 percent 
in Thailand. Finally, China remained largely closed to foreign banks between 1995 and 2002. 
  Overall, the data on foreign bank participation suggests that regional trends in foreign 
bank presence were common to most countries within each region, with the share of assets held   7
by foreign banks rising in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and Sub-Saharan 
Africa, and remaining constant or declining in East Asia, South Asia, North Africa and the 
Middle East. 
 
3. Survey of the causes and implications of foreign bank participation 
  This section reviews the literature on the causes and implications of foreign bank 
participation in developing countries. Regarding the impact of foreign bank participation, we 
summarize the existing evidence on the effects of foreign bank presence on efficiency, bank 
competition, stability, and access to credit. 
 
3.1. What drives foreign bank participation? 
To date the existing literature on foreign bank entry discusses the following factors as 
potential drivers of foreign bank participation: (a) banks’ desire to service their customers abroad 
– the so called “follow the clients” motive, (b) host-specific factors including market 
opportunities and regulatory barriers
 and (c) economic and cultural ties and institutional and 
regulatory similarities between home and host countries.
6 
An early strand of the literature on the decision by foreign banks to operate overseas 
focused on the experience of developed countries (especially the U.S.) with foreign bank entry 
and bank internationalization during the 1970s and 1980s (see Goldberg and Saunders, 1980, 
1981a, b; Ball and Tschoegl, 1982, Nigh et al., 1986; Cho et al., 1987; Hultman and McGee, 
1989; Goldberg and Johnson, 1990; Goldberg and Grosse, 1994, Fisher and Molyneaux, 1996). 
A majority of these studies find support for the hypothesis that banks go abroad to service their 
domestic clients with overseas operations. Most studies test this hypothesis by looking at the 
significance of variables such as the level of foreign direct investment by non-financial firms into 
the host country. While the evidence on the “follow the clients” motivation seems solid when it 
comes to developed countries, there is less consensus as to its importance in driving foreign bank 
participation in developing countries. Most of the early studies that explored this hypothesis 
included few developing host countries in their sample. Furthermore, in one case where separate 
estimations where conducted for the subsample of developing countries (see Miller and Parkhe, 
                                                 
6 These factors are also highlighted by Clarke et al. (2003). The main difference is that we cite evidence based 
primarily on foreign entry into developing countries. They primarily refer to literature on foreign bank activities in 
the U.S. and other developed countries.   8
1998), the authors could not find a significant link between foreign direct investment by non-
financial firms and foreign bank activities in those countries. 
Relative to the “follow the clients” motivation, there is consistent evidence for the 
importance of local market opportunities in driving foreign bank participation. Using data on the 
location choices of 143 banks with at least one shareholding abroad across 28 countries 
(including 6 developing countries: Czech Republic, Hungary, Korea, Poland and Turkey), 
Focarelli and Pozzolo (2001) find greater foreign bank entry in countries where the expected rate 
of economic growth is higher. Analyzing 2,300 international bank mergers that took place 
between 1978 and 2000 in developed and developing countries, Buch and DeLong (2004) find 
that foreign banks tend to go to larger yet less developed economies, where there is the prospect 
for economies of scale and future growth opportunities. Similarly, looking into the foreign direct 
investments of German banks across 190 countries during the second half of the 1990s, Buch and 
Lipponer (2004) find that, other things equal, German banks are attracted to larger markets (in 
terms of GDP).  
Many studies have also documented the importance of regulatory barriers as obstacles to 
foreign bank entry. In their study of international bank mergers, Buch and De Long (2004) find 
that banks operating in more regulated environments are less likely to be the targets of 
international bank mergers. Similarly, Focarelli and Pozzolo (2001) find that foreign banks 
prefer to invest in countries with fewer regulatory restrictions on bank activities. Looking at the 
foreign asset holdings between 1983 and 1999 of international banks that report data to the Bank 
for International Settlements, Buch (2003) finds that regulations are important in influencing the 
international asset choice of banks. Finally, focusing on the specific case of German banks’ 
foreign assets holdings across countries, Buch and Lipponer (2004) find that if countries impose 
controls on cross-border financial credits, they receive less foreign direct investment from 
German banks and banks also perform fewer cross-border financial services in those countries. 
The evidence on the importance of geographical proximity and economic and cultural 
similarities in driving foreign bank participation is quite overwhelming. Studies such as  Buch 
and De Long (2004), Buch (2003), Galindo, Micco, and Serra (2003), Buch and Lipponer 
(2004), Claessens and Van Horen (2006) have shown that bilateral distance, sharing a border, 
speaking a common language, having common colonial ties are all factors that influence foreign 
bank entry. There is also some evidence that similarities in the legal, regulatory and institutional   9
environment matter, but there is less agreement as to whether absolute differences or differences 
vis-à-vis competitors are important. Galindo, Micco, and Serra (2003) argue that absolute legal, 
regulatory and institutional differences across countries can increase entry costs and reduce the 
participation of banks in foreign countries. Using bilateral foreign banking data for 176 
countries, the authors find results that support their hypotheses. In other words, they find that 
foreign bank penetration is higher between countries that have similar legal origins, banking 
regulations, and institutional set ups. On the other hand, Claessens and Van Horen (2006) argue 
that what is important in driving foreign bank participation is not the difference between the 
institutional environment in the host and source country, but rather the difference taking into 
account the institutional quality of the competitors from other source countries. Using data for 
most banks in all developing countries, the authors find that absolute levels of institutional 
differences between the host and source countries do not matter once they control for the relative 
advantage the source country has compared to its competitors from other countries operating in 
the same host. 
  To summarize, there is substantial evidence that factors such as market opportunities, 
regulatory barriers in the host countries along with economic, cultural and institutional 
similarities between home and host economies influence the decision of banks to operate 
overseas. Contrary to the wealth of evidence on these factors, the role that crises can play in 
bringing about foreign bank participation has only been discussed anecdotally. For example, in 
discussing the rise in foreign bank participation in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, Peek and 
Rosengren (2000) mention the Tequila Crisis in Mexico and Argentina and the 1999 Brazilian 
crises as catalytic events. Moreno and Villar (2006) also point to the experience of Mexico in 
stating that foreign bank entry might be stimulated by the need for countries to recapitalize their 
banking systems in the aftermath of crises. Similarly, Tschoegl (2003) discusses the importance 
of crises in bringing about the subsequent entry of foreign banks in emerging markets focusing 
on 12 countries. Yet, solid empirical evidence on the role of crises is lacking. Section 4 will 
attempt to fill the gap in the literature by exploring the statistical association between crises and 
foreign bank participation. We turn next to the implications of foreign bank participation for the 
degree of competition, efficiency, stability and access to credit in the host countries. 
   10
3.2. What is the impact of foreign bank participation in developing countries? 
 
(i) Competition & Efficiency 
  The promises of efficiency improvements and greater competition in the banking sector 
are perhaps the main arguments brought forth by proponents of foreign bank entry. As detailed 
below, with the exception of research that focuses on Latin America where the evidence is 
mixed, existing studies on the impact of foreign bank participation on efficiency and competition 
largely support the claim that foreign banks operating in developing countries are more efficient 
than domestic banks (i.e., have lower overhead costs), charge lower spreads, and help promote 
bank competition by pressuring other banks to lower their costs and their spreads.   
Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2001), Claessens and Lee (2003), and 
Claessens and Laeven (2003) offer cross-country evidence on the benefits of foreign bank 
participation in terms of efficiency gains and greater competition. Using data for 80 countries 
from 1995 to 1998, Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2001) find that foreign bank 
participation is associated with a reduction in profitability, non-interest income and overhead 
expenses of domestic banks – results which they interpret as indications of greater efficiency and 
competition due to foreign bank participation. In a follow-up paper, Claessens and Lee (2003) 
focus on financial systems in 58 low-income countries. They find that the increased presence of 
foreign banks benefited the local banking sector by reducing financial intermediation costs 
making the banking system more efficient and robust.  Following the Panzar and Rose (1987) 
methodology to obtain a parameter that quantifies the degree of competition in the banking 
sector in 50 countries between 1994 and 2001, Claessens and Laeven (2003) find that systems 
with greater foreign bank entry and with fewer activity and entry restrictions are more 
competitive.  
  A variety of country and regional case studies complement the cross-country literature on 
the impact of foreign bank participation on efficiency and competition. Using bank accounting 
data from Philippines for 1990-98, Unite and Sullivan (2002) investigate how foreign bank entry 
and increased foreign ownership of banks in that country affected bank efficiency and 
competition. The authors find that greater foreign bank entry reduced the interest rates and 
operating expenses of domestic banks, but not their profitability. They conclude that foreign 
competition forced domestic banks to be more efficient. Denizer (2000) studies the impact of   11
foreign bank participation in Turkey between 1980 and 1997. The study shows that foreign bank 
entry had a positive impact on competition in the sector as witnessed by the decline in profits and 
overhead costs. Looking at the performance of 219 banks, between 1995-2001, from a sample of 
ten countries in Central and Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia, and Slovakia), Uiboupin (2004) offers evidence 
consistent with the notion that foreign bank entry increased competition in those countries. In 
particular, the study finds that foreign entry is associated with lower profits, non-interest income, 
and loan interest rates.  
  In the case of Latin America, however, the evidence on the impact of foreign bank entry 
on bank competition and efficiency is mixed. Studies such as Barajas, Steiner, and Salazar 
(2000)  and Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) offer evidence in favor of the hypothesis that 
foreign bank participation improves efficiency and competition. On the other hand, others such 
as Haber and Musacchio (2005), Schulz (2006) and Levy-Yeyati and Micco (2007) provide 
evidence to the contrary. 
    Barajas,  Steiner,  and  Salazar  (2000) study the competitive effect of foreign entry in 
Colombia, using panel estimation and controlling for other aspects of financial liberalization 
(including the number and relative size of new domestic entrants and overall increases in capital 
flows). They find that foreign entry improved the efficiency of the domestic banking system by 
reducing nonfinancial costs. Similarly, Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) offer evidence 
consistent with the notion that foreign bank participation had positive implications for the Latin 
American region enhancing efficiency and competition. Focusing on Argentina, Chile, 
Colombia, and Mexico, Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) find that foreign bank participation did 
not affect spreads directly, but caused a drop in administrative costs. This result is consistent 
with the notion that foreign participation improved efficiency and fostered competition.   
  In the case of Mexico, foreign bank participation has not been found to increase 
competition and efficiency. Haber and Musacchio (2005) show that the entry of foreign banks 
led, instead, to a retrenchment in lending and no improvements in efficiency and competition. 
They argue that this is related to the fact that Mexico had an extremely concentrated banking 
system both before and after foreign bank entry. Focusing also on the case of Mexico, Schulz 
(2006) shows that foreign bank entry from 1997 to 2004 had no effect on administrative costs 
and employment levels. He too argues that this lack of impact on the overall efficiency of the   12
sector can be explained as a result of limited competitive pressures. Finally, using data for eight 
countries in the region – Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Mexico 
and Peru - Levy Yeyati and Micco (2007) find that foreign bank penetration weakened 
competition in the region as measured by the H statistic proposed in Panzar and Rose (1987). 
  All in all the evidence on competition and efficiency suggests that foreign bank entry can 
bring potential gains in this area except in environments which limit competitive forces such as 




  The rise in importance of foreign banks in developing countries has led to an intense 
debate on the pros and cons of foreign bank participation in terms of its impact on stability. 
Those opposed to foreign bank participation argue that because foreign banks have weaker ties to 
developing nations and have more alternative business opportunities than domestic banks, they 
are more likely to be fickle lenders. Furthermore, there is also the potential that they could 
import shocks from their home countries. On the other hand, in favor of greater stability is the 
notion that foreign banks are typically well diversified institutions, with access to many sources 
of liquidity that will be less affected by shocks. 
Though some studies have found that foreign banks can respond to shocks from their 
home countries (see Goldberg, 2002; Martinez Peria, Powell and Vladkova-Hollar, 2005), a 
larger number of studies have found that they tend to be more stable lenders than domestic 
banks, in particular during periods of crisis in developing countries. Looking at the behavior of 
banks in Argentina and Mexico during the 1994-95 Tequila crisis, Goldberg, Dages and Kinney 
(2000) find that foreign banks generally had higher loan growth rates than their domestically-
owned counterparts, with lower volatility of lending contributing to lower overall volatility of 
credit. Peek and Rosengren (2000) reach a similar conclusion after examining direct and cross-
border foreign bank lending in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico during 1994-1999. Using bank 
level data for the late 1990s for Argentina, Chile and Colombia, Crystal, Dages, and Goldberg 
(2001) show that foreign banks on average exhibited higher loan growth rates than domestic 
banks. Examining the behavior of foreign and domestic banks in Malaysia during the 1997-98 
Asian crisis, Detragiache and Gupta (2006) find no evidence that foreign banks abandoned the   13
local market during the crisis. Finally, De Haas and van Lelyveld (2006) examine how foreign 
and domestic banks in ten Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) reacted to business cycle 
conditions and host country banking crises from 1993 to 2000.
7  Their results show that while 
during crises domestic banks contracted their credit, foreign banks maintained their credit 
supply.  
Overall, the evidence available so far suggests that foreign banks can have a stabilizing 
influence on credit markets in developing countries, at least where financial sector depth is 
concerned. Next we turn to the impact of foreign bank participation on financial sector breadth or 
reach. 
 
(iii) Access to credit  
  The extent to which foreign banks contribute to greater access to credit, in particular for 
small firms, in developing countries is perhaps the most controversial aspect of the process of 
foreign bank participation. Those opposing this process ague that foreign banks are likely to 
“cherry pick” the most profitable and transparent customers, reducing financing to some market 
segments, like small businesses. On the other hand, those in favor of foreign bank entry point to 
the fact that foreign banks have access to a larger pool of loanable funds that can help them 
sustain higher levels of lending. Also, proponents of foreign bank participation argue that even if 
foreign banks focus on the most transparent firms, this process can enhance access to credit by 
smaller firms by forcing domestic banks to move down the market. The existing empirical 
evidence on the impact of foreign bank participation on access to credit is to date mixed. 
  Studies such as Berger, et al. (2001), Detragiache, Gupta, and Tressel (2005), and Mian 
(2006) present evidence that suggests that foreign banks limit access and serve only the largest 
and most transparent firms in an economy. Using data for 61,295 firms with 195,695 loans from 
115 different banks in Argentina as of the end of 1998, Berger et al. (2001) find that smaller and 
more opaque firms are less likely to obtain loans from large or foreign-owned banks. 
Detragiache, Gupta and Tressel (2005) develop a model that shows that when foreign banks have 
a more efficient technology to monitor high-end customers than domestic banks, foreign bank 
participation may lead to lower aggregate credit, higher operating costs, and lower welfare. 
Using data for 89 low income and lower middle income countries, they find that a larger foreign 
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bank presence is associated with shallower credit markets and slower credit growth, as in the 
“cream-skimming” equilibrium in their model.  Focusing specifically on the case of Pakistan, 
using a panel of 80,000 loans over 7 years, Mian (2006) finds that foreign banks in Pakistan shy 
away from lending to “soft information” firms such as those that are small, located in rural areas, 
not affiliated with business groups, or seeking first-time loans and long-term relational financing. 
Also, he finds that foreign banks are less likely to bilaterally renegotiate and are less successful 
at recovering loans. Finally, Mian shows that measures of geographical or cultural distance 
between the firm in the host country and the home country go a long way in explaining the 
differences found in the lending, recovery, and renegotiation patterns of foreign and domestic 
banks. 
  In contrast to the studies discussed above, research by Clarke, Cull, Martinez Peria and 
Sanchez (2005), Giannetti and Ongena (2005), and Clarke, Cull and Martinez Peria (2006) offers 
some evidence that foreign bank participation may not always be pernicious for access to credit 
in host developing countries.  Using bank-level data for four Latin American countries 
(Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Peru) during the mid-1990s, Clarke, Cull, Martinez Peria and 
Sanchez (2005) investigate whether bank origin affects the share and growth of lending to small 
businesses. While they find that on average foreign banks seem to lend less to small businesses, 
they also uncover significant differences between small and large foreign banks. In fact, at least 
in these countries, large foreign banks often surpass large domestic banks in their share and 
growth of lending to small businesses.  
  Instead of using bank level data, Giannetti and Ongena (2005) and Clarke, Cull and 
Martinez Peria (2006) offer evidence on the effects of foreign bank participation on access to 
credit using firm-level data. Giannetti and Ongena (2005) employ a large panel of almost 60,000 
firm-year observations on listed and unlisted companies in Eastern Europe to investigate the 
impact of foreign bank lending on firm growth and financing. They find that foreign lending 
stimulates growth in firm sales, assets, and leverage. Though the effect is smaller for small firms, 
they conclude that large firms benefit more from foreign bank presence, but even small 
companies profit from foreign bank entry.  Combining responses from a survey of over 3,000 
firms operating in 35 developing countries with data on the degree of foreign bank presence 
across these countries, Clarke et al. (2006) find that all enterprises, including small and medium-  15
sized ones, report facing lower financing obstacles in countries having higher levels of foreign 
bank presence. 
  In summary, the evidence on the implications of foreign bank participation for access to 
credit suggests that foreign banks are generally less inclined to lend to small and opaque 
borrowers relative to domestic banks. Nevertheless, there is also evidence that their presence can 
have overall positive effects on access to credit, even if foreign banks themselves are not lending 
to small firms. 
  
4. Foreign bank participation and crises 
  This section studies the link between foreign bank presence and crises. We begin by 
presenting data on the prevalence of banking crises and on the post-crisis levels of foreign 
participation across regions. Then, we use cross-country regressions to test whether countries 
that had crises also had higher levels of foreign participation in banking. Next, we present panel 
estimations with country-level fixed effects that allow us to control for unobserved country 
characteristics and enable us to pinpoint better the timing of the increases in foreign bank 
presence. In this way, we can assess whether foreign participation occurred in response to 
banking crises. Finally, we conduct panel regressions that test whether higher levels of foreign 
participation coincided with increased provision of credit to the private sector.  
 
4.1 Crises and Foreign Bank Participation: General Patterns  
Banking crises are a fact of life in developing economies. Since the mid-1990s, 77 crises 
episodes have taken place in 72 developing countries. Table 2 shows crisis episodes as identified 
by Caprio and Klingebiel (2003). The table illustrates that banking crises have occurred in at 
least one country in each region of the developing world.  
Crises represent enormous challenges to policy-makers in developing countries. As 
shown in Table 2, the costs of dealing with crises (e.g., paying for deposit losses, recapitalizing 
banks, and building banking systems that are more resilient to shocks) can be very large. 
Moreover, most crises have macroeconomic roots and take place in environments where 
governments have already difficult fiscal situations. Table 3 shows the average budget deficit to 
GDP in each region three years before and three years after crises. This table illustrates how even   16
before the start of crises, governments in most regions were already running budget deficits, a 
fact that should hamper their ability to deal with the cost of these episodes subsequently. 
  Yet, crises also represent opportunities for developing countries since they prompt 
governments to think differently and creatively about the problems they confront. In many 
developing countries, crises have encouraged governments to deregulate their banking sectors 
and to allow the entry of foreign banks. Table 4 shows average values of a measure of banking 
sector restrictions across countries that had crises between 1995 and 2002 and those that did not.
8 
The index takes values from 1 to 5 with higher values representing greater restrictions. With the 
exception of Asia, countries that have experienced crises tended to be more open subsequently 
than countries that never experienced a crisis. 
Though many studies have discussed the catalytic role that crises can play in promoting 
foreign bank participation in developing countries, few have offered systematic evidence to this 
effect. We begin by plotting the share of foreign bank assets in each region in a five year period 
following crises occurring between 1995 and 2002. The most reliable time series on foreign bank 
assets, which was constructed by Micco et al. (2006) from Bankscope data, are only available for 
those years. Because crises did not occur in the same years in all countries, we date as “t” the 
first year of the crisis for each country and we take the average share of foreign bank 
participation at that point in time for each region. We compute regional averages for each year 
after the crisis within a five year window in the same manner.  
We see from Figure 2 that crises in Africa, Latin America, and in particular, in Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia have been followed by an increase in foreign bank participation. On 
average, the share of assets held by foreign banks in Eastern Europe and Central Asia increased 
from 10 to 32 percent within the five year period following crises. In Africa, foreign bank 
participation increased from an average of 32 percent to almost 45 percent five years after crises. 




                                                 
8 Among the restrictions that the Heritage Foundation considers in constructing this index are: the ease with which 
foreign banks can open branches and subsidiaries, government interference in the allocation of credit including 
government ownership of banks, the ability of private banks to operate without government regulation such as 
deposit insurance, and the ability of banks to provide a wide range of financial services (including real estate and 
securities transactions, and insurance).    17
 
4.2.  Crises and Foreign Participation: Cross-Country Regressions 
  To further assess the role that crises play in promoting foreign bank participation we 
estimate equation (1), in which we regress the change in foreign bank participation between 1995 
and 2002 on a dummy for whether countries had crises over this period along with a number of 
controls: 
∆ Foreign Bank Participationi = α + β1Crisisi + β2’Macroi + β3Banking Indexi +           (1)                
                                          β4Property Rights Indexi + β5Market Sizei +      
            β6Initial Foreign Participationi + β7’Regional Dummiesi + εi.  
    
∆  Foreign Participation is the change in the share of banking sector assets held by 
foreign banks in country i between 1995 and 2002, based on the data from Micco et al. (2006). 
Crisis is a dummy variable equal to one if a country experienced a systemic banking crisis at any 
point during the period of study as defined in Caprio and Klingebiel (2003). Macro is a matrix of 
two variables, inflation and total output growth, intended to capture the attractiveness of an 
environment for prospective foreign entrants. Inflation is averaged over the period; output 
growth is the total change in real output from 1995 to 2002.
9 We expect foreign bank 
participation to increase with GDP growth because it reflects opportunities for the profitable 
provision of financial services (especially lending), and to decrease with the level of inflation 
because it reflects uncertainty and, perhaps, macroeconomic mismanagement by the government. 
Both of those factors make medium and long-term lending problematic.  
The  Banking Index is taken from the Heritage Foundation which reports a yearly 
assessment of the level of banking restrictions in a country. As noted, the index ranges from 1 to 
5 with higher scores indicating greater restrictions. Among the restrictions that the Heritage 
Foundation considers in constructing this index are the ease with which foreign banks can open 
branches and subsidiaries; government interference in the allocation of credit, including 
government ownership of banks; the ability of private banks to operate without government 
regulation such as deposit insurance; and the ability of banks to provide a wide range of financial 
services (including real estate and securities transactions, and insurance). We would expect that 
more restrictive environments would be less receptive to foreign bank participation. For their 
                                                 
9 The construction of these variables is intended to minimize the influence of yearly observations that are outliers. In 
the fixed effects regressions in the next section, which are of necessity based on yearly observations, we remove 
observations for inflation and output growth on the tails of their respective distributions (< 1
st percentile, > 99
th 
percentile).    18
part, foreign banks would also likely find it unattractive to enter restrictive environments. Thus, 
we expect a negative relation between the Banking Index and Foreign Participation. 
  Property Rights Index measures the level of protection of private property in a country. 
Like the Banking Index, it ranges from 1 to 5 with lower values indicating better protection of 
property. In constructing this measure, the Heritage Foundation considers the extent to which the 
government protects and enforces laws to protect private property, the likelihood that the 
government will itself expropriate property, the existence of a commercial code, and the speed 
and efficacy of the judiciary in resolving contractual disputes. We expect foreign banks to be 
more prevalent in countries that better protect private property, and thus a negative relation 
between the index and foreign bank participation in the regressions that follow.
10  
  In some specifications, we include a measure of market size, namely the log of GDP 
averaged from 1995 to 2002. Controlling for the quality of the macroeconomic environment and 
banking sector, foreign banks might find larger markets more attractive, and thus we expect a 
positive relationship between the log of GDP and foreign bank participation. We include the 
share of banking sector assets held by foreign-owned banks in 1995-96, Initial Foreign 
Participation, in some specifications to test whether foreign bank participation grew more 
rapidly in countries that had little foreign bank presence at the outset of the period. The intuition 
is that the process of foreign bank entry was already complete in countries with high foreign 
participation shares. We would therefore expect a negative relation between the level of foreign 
participation in 1995-96 and subsequent changes in foreign bank participation. 
  Finally, we include regional dummy variables in some specifications. As illustrated in the 
figures above, the level of foreign bank participation and its response to banking crises varied 
across regions, with relatively high levels in Africa, Latin America, and Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia as compared with East Asia and the Pacific, the Middle East and North Africa, and 
South Asia. Post-crisis increases in foreign bank participation also tended to be steeper in Africa, 
Latin America, and, especially, in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. We include the regional 
dummies to control for some of these differences in the evolution of foreign participation. We 
note, however, that these dummies are also likely to rob the banking crisis variable of some 
                                                 
10 Two advantages of the Heritage indexes are that the underlying methodology has been consistent over time and 
the country coverage is wide. We can therefore construct a balanced panel that captures the same concepts over time 
for a wide array of countries.  
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explanatory power since the occurrence and severity of crises also evince a regional pattern. We, 
therefore, view the models that include the regional dummies as a stricter test of the relationship 
between crises and foreign bank participation. 
  The main result from Table 5 is that countries that had banking crises tended to have 
larger increases in foreign bank participation than those did not. The banking crisis coefficient is 
significant at the ten percent level or better in all but one specification. In that model (column 4), 
it just misses significance. These findings confirm and expand upon those of Mathieson and 
Roldós (2001), who found a significant positive association between banking crises and various 
measures of foreign participation and foreign ownership of banks for fifteen countries over a 
shorter period (1995 to 1999). They find that, controlling for many of the same factors that we do 
in Table 5, foreign bank participation in 1999 (defined as we do) was 9.2 percentage points 
higher in countries that had a banking crisis.  In our models, which are estimated over a much 
wider set of countries, foreign participation increased by 7.5 to 11.3 percentage points between 
1995 and 2002 for countries that suffered a banking crisis. 
  As hypothesized, GDP growth is significantly positively related to foreign bank 
participation. In the specifications that include regional dummies (3, 4, 7, and 8) inflation is 
negative, as hypothesized, though the coefficient does not achieve significance. In almost all 
cases, neither the banking restrictions index nor the insecurity of property rights index is 
significant. The exception is the banking restrictions coefficient in model 6, which has the 
expected negative sign. The insignificance of the banking and property rights indexes might be 
because better (i.e., lower) scores on those indexes also indicate a healthier environment for 
private domestic banks, making it more difficult for foreign banks to enter and compete. 
  The initial level of foreign bank participation is negative and approaches or achieves 
significance in all specifications in which it is included (columns 4-8), which suggests that it is a 
relevant control variable. The coefficients for the regional dummies reflect the foreign 
participation patterns described above, with Asia and the Middle East lagging the omitted region, 
Africa. As anticipated, the inclusion of the regional dummies, and also market size and initial 
foreign participation, reduces the significance and magnitude of the banking crisis variable to 
some extent. However, in our most complete specification (column 8), the coefficient is 
significant at ten percent and its magnitude (7.8 percentage points) is only slightly smaller than 
for the less complete models. The results in this sub-section indicate that, all else equal, banking   20
crises are associated with increased foreign bank participation. Admittedly, however, cross-
sectional regressions are not ideal for assessing whether crises actually caused those increases 
because of the potential for relevant omitted country characteristics that might drive both foreign 
bank participation and crises.       
 
4.3  The Timing of Foreign Bank  Participation: Regressions with Country Fixed Effects 
To address the concerns with cross-country regressions and to better understand the 
timing of changes in foreign bank participation as a result of crises, we conduct panel estimations 
following equations (2) and (2’) below: 
 
Foreign Bank Participationit = αi + β1Crisisit + β2’Macroit + β3Banking Indexit +                                (2)  
                                           β4Property Rights Indexit + β5Market Sizeit + β6’Year Dummiesit + εit. 
 
 
Foreign Bank Participationit = αi + β1Crisisit + β2Post-Crisisit +β2’Macroit +           (2’) 
           β3Banking Indexit + β4Property Rights Indexit + β5Market Sizeit +  
         β6’Year Dummiesit + εit. 
 
Both in (2) and (2’), αi represents the average level of foreign bank participation for country i 
over the period. Thus, coefficients in both equations indicate departures from country-specific 
mean participation levels that are associated with changes in our explanatory variables. Because 
we include country fixed effects in the regression, we can no longer include regional dummies as 
these do not vary over time. We can, however, include year dummies, which we do in some 
specifications. Because crises occurred in waves, the yearly dummies are likely to reduce the 
explanatory power of the banking crisis variable. It is therefore questionable whether they should 
be included. Finally, both in (2) and (2’), we include similar macro and institutional controls to 
those included in the cross-section regressions discussed above. 
  There is one important difference between equation (2) and (2’). In equation (2), the 
banking crisis variable is a dummy equal to one if a country was in crisis in a given year as 
defined by Caprio and Klingebiel (2003). For pre- and post-crisis years, the dummy is equal to 
zero. Thus, the banking crisis coefficient in equation (2) picks up a simple comparison between 
crisis and non-crisis years. Pre- and post-crisis years are lumped together as non-crisis years. To 
test separately whether crisis periods differ from pre-crisis and post-crisis years, we estimate 
equation (2’). In that equation, we include a new crisis variable equal to one from the onset of the   21
crisis onwards. Furthermore, we introduce a post-crisis dummy equal to one beginning in the 
year after Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) determined a crisis to have ended. The coefficient for the 
new crisis variable measures the level shift in foreign bank participation relative to the pre-crisis 
period, while the post-crisis dummy reflects the shift relative to the crisis period.   
  In Table 6, columns (1)-(4) reflect the specifications following equation (2) where the 
crisis dummy identifies periods of crisis vis-à-vis all other periods (i.e., post and pre-crisis 
periods are lumped together). In the specifications that exclude the year dummies (columns 1 and 
2), the level of foreign bank participation is 6-7 percentage points lower in crisis years. When we 
introduce the year dummies in columns (3) and (4), the reduction in foreign bank participation is 
only 2.2-2.4 percentage points, but the crisis variable remains significant at the ten percent level.   
    Columns (5)-(8) of Table 6 correspond to equation (2’). In this case, we separately 
control for crisis and post-crisis periods. When we do this, the crisis coefficient in models (5)-(8) 
is insignificant except for the positive, marginally significant coefficient in model (5). These 
results indicate that foreign banks did not reduce their participation in crisis years. Moreover, the 
positive significant coefficients for the post-crisis dummy in models (5)-(7) indicate that the 
steep increase in foreign participation occurred after crises had passed. In model (8), the post-
crisis dummy is positive, but it does not achieve significance. Again, however, there are good 
reasons to exclude the year dummies from these specifications, in which case the most relevant 
model is (6), which shows a strong association between foreign participation and the post-crisis 
dummy. In addition, in model (8) the bank crisis dummy is negative and nearly significant. We 
can therefore nearly reject the null that the crisis and post-crisis dummies are equal to each other 
(F-statistic 2.13, p-value 0.12) for that model. 
In short, models (5)-(8) indicate that foreign banks did not retreat during crises, and 
increased their participation in the aftermath of crises. Thus, the negative crisis coefficients in 
models (1)-(4) are attributable to the high levels of foreign participation in post-crisis years 
rather than low levels in crisis years (relative to pre-crisis years). 
Many of the control variables are more highly significant in the fixed effects regressions 
in Table 6 than they were in the cross-country regressions in Table 5. For example, inflation is 
significantly negatively related to foreign participation in all models in which it appears, as 
hypothesized. Similarly, the coefficients for restrictions in banking and the insecurity of property 
rights are significant and negative in multiple specifications. However, GDP growth is not   22
robustly associated with foreign bank participation, and the negative significant coefficient in 
model (4) is unexpected. This could be due to collinearity between GDP growth and other 
regressors (most notably inflation). 
Discussions about whether foreign banks have behaved opportunistically in response to 
crises are often inconclusive because they hinge on how opportunism is defined, which requires 
subjectivity. For example, if one defines as opportunistic foreign banks’ profiting from their 
participation in stable periods and retreating during crises, the results in this section indicate that 
they have not behaved opportunistically. However, our results could be consistent with foreign 
banks acquiring cheap domestic banking assets as a result of crises, which could be viewed as 
opportunistic. We refrain from drawing that conclusion for two reasons. First, the acquisition of 
distressed banking assets (e.g., from intervened banks) by foreign interests is often viewed as 
beneficial by regulators and supervisors coping with the aftermath of a crisis. Indeed, those 
officials often look to foreign investors to help re-capitalize their banking sectors because they 
lack other options due to the fiscal constraints discussed above. Second, the post-crisis increase 
in foreign participation might not be due to acquisitions or de novo entry, but to more rapid 
growth of the assets of the pre-crisis roster of foreign banks relative to domestic ones. 
 
4.4.  Foreign Participation, Crises, and Private Credit  
 
  One potential negative by-product of crises is the destruction of information generated 
via long-term relationships between borrowers and failed banks. Even in the case where banks 
are not closed but are merged or acquired, a disruption in lending relationships might result from 
the restructuring and reorganization that typically takes place within banks following mergers 
and acquisitions. Since they are at a relative disadvantage in local knowledge, foreign banks, and 
particularly recent entrants, might not be well suited to reconstituting such relationships. Thus, 
while our evidence indicates that the asset share of foreign banks has increased after crises, it 
does not necessarily follow that greater participation has gone hand in hand with more lending. 
In this section, therefore, we examine whether foreign bank participation coincided with 
increased provision of credit to the private sector, especially after crises. 
  We use fixed-country-effects specifications similar to those in Table 6, except that the 
level of private credit relative to GDP is the dependent variable:   23
 
Private Creditit = αi + β1Post-Crisisit + β2FOB shareit + β3Post-Crisis*FOB shareit  +       (3)          
   β6’Macroit + β6Banking Indexit +  β7Property Rightsit + β8Market Sizeit +  
   β9’Year Dummiesit + εit. 
 
   In equation (3), we include the post-crisis dummy variable on its own (i.e., without the 
crisis dummy) because that is the most likely period for recovery in lending. FOB share is the 
share of banking sector assets held by foreign-owned banks. This variable is included to test 
whether foreign bank participation was associated with higher levels of credit to the private 
sector. We also interact FOB share with the post-crisis dummy to test whether the association 
between foreign bank participation and private credit remained the same after crisis. In some 
specifications, we include the share of banking sector assets held by the top 3 banks in each 
country because sector concentration could lead to higher interest rates and less lending.  
  The positive significant coefficients for the post-crisis variable in columns 1 and 2 
indicate that private credit levels tends to be higher in the aftermaths of crises, which could be 
taken as a sign of recovery. In addition, the positive, significant coefficients for FOB Share in 
those specifications indicate that increased foreign participation is associated with higher levels 
of private credit (relative to each country’s average private credit level over the period). 
However, the negative significant coefficient for the FOB*post-crisis interaction is similar in 
magnitude to the positive FOB share coefficient. Thus, the positive association between foreign 
participation and the extension of credit to the private sector pertains only to the pre-crisis and 
crisis periods.  
Because these results might be driven by how we specified the post-crisis dummy 
variable, columns (5) and (6) use the crisis and post-crisis dummies that we used in Table 6 in 
the regressions above. Inclusion of both of those dummies provides a more precise comparison 
between private credit levels in the pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis periods. Though the crisis 
dummy is positive and weakly significant in one specification, the post-crisis dummies remain 
positive and highly significant, indicating that the increase in private credit levels occurred in the 
post-crisis period. The pre-crisis and crisis periods tend to be statistically indistinguishable from 
one another. With the inclusion of the crisis dummy the foreign bank participation variable 
remains positive, though it loses some significance. The FOB*post-crisis interaction remains 
negative and highly significant. If anything, the results in columns (5) and (6) provide a stronger   24
suggestion that, in the aftermath of crises, high foreign bank participation levels are associated 
with lower private credit levels.  
Does this imply that foreign banks pull back from lending as a result of crisis?   Not 
necessarily because, as noted above, it could be that foreign banks are acquiring distressed banks 
with relatively weak loan portfolios. Many of those loans are written off in restructuring 
exercises prior to the sale of banks to foreign investors, and thus the reduction in private credit is 
a mechanical accounting exercise rather than a reflection of slow post-crisis credit growth. The 
negative, significant results for the FOB*post-crisis interaction could be picking up these 
selection effects. 
To test for that possibility, we try to distinguish between established banks and recent 
entrants by introducing a new variable: the interaction between the level of foreign participation 
at the beginning of the sample period and the post-crisis dummy. If FOB share is close to initial 
FOB, the level of foreign participation has remained relatively constant throughout the sample 
period. In those environments, we hypothesize that foreign banks are better established. By 
contrast, environments where foreign participation is much higher than it was initially are likely 
to be characterized by the recent acquisitions of distressed banks described above. We expect 
therefore that the negative association between foreign participation and private credit in the 
post-crisis period will be smaller (in absolute value) in countries where initial and post-crisis 
foreign participation levels are close to one another. In other words, if our conjectures are 
correct, we expect a positive coefficient on the initial FOB*post-crisis interaction. 
In columns (3) and (4) of Table 7, we include the initial FOB interaction in specifications 
with only one crisis variable, the post-crisis dummy. That dummy remains positive and 
significant.  FOB share remains positive in those specifications, while the FOB*post-crisis 
variables remains negative. Both are highly significant. As hypothesized, the initial FOB*post-
crisis interaction is positive and significant. When FOB share and initial FOB are equivalent, the 
two interaction terms roughly cancel out one another. In those cases, there is no post-crisis 
reduction in private credit, and thus the positive association between FOB share and private 
credit holds for all periods (pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis). The same pattern holds when we 
introduce the crisis dummy in columns (7) and (8). In short, these results are consistent with the 
idea that post-crisis reductions in private credit in countries with high levels of foreign bank 
participation are due the recent acquisitions of troubled domestic banks. We cannot, however,   25
rule out the possibility that the newly arrived banks are simply poorer financial intermediaries for 
the private sector. In environments where foreign banks are better established, there is no such 
reduction. Indeed, foreign participation appears to have a positive effect on private credit 
provision regardless of the occurrence of crises. 
One might object to our characterizing all environments where foreign participation 
remained relatively constant as having relatively well-established foreign banks. In some 
countries, foreign participation remained negligible throughout the period, and thus foreign 
participation should have had little or no effect on private credit levels. To test whether it is 
countries with low, stable levels of foreign participation that are responsible for the results in 
Table 8, we restrict the sample to countries that exceeded various thresholds of initial foreign 
participation (5%, 10%, and 20%). Because it splits the sample into groups of roughly equal size, 
the results for the 10% threshold appear in Table 8. Qualitative results are similar for the 5% and 
20% thresholds. 
The pattern of significant results found in Table 8 – i.e., positive for FOB share, negative 
for FOB*post-crisis, and positive for initial FOB*post-crisis – is only found for countries that 
had initial foreign participation above 10% (Table 8, columns (1) and (2)). For countries with 
initial participation less than 10% (columns (3) and (4)), none of the foreign bank participation 
variables are significant. Therefore, the results in Table 7 are being driven by countries that had 
reasonably high levels of foreign participation, and, within that group, the positive relationship 
between foreign participation and private credit is due to those with participation levels that 
remained relatively constant over time. The results in Table 8, therefore, provide additional 
support for the idea that, in the aftermath of crises, better established foreign banks provide more 
credit to the private sector than recent foreign entrants, perhaps because those entrants tend to 
acquire distressed banks. For countries with low levels of participation, the foreign ownership 
variables explain little variation in private credit levels, as one would expect.
11 
To summarize the results from this section, we find that countries that experienced at 
least one banking sector crisis from 1995 to 2002 tended to have more foreign bank participation 
                                                 
11 It is interesting to note that the post-crisis dummy is significant only for the countries that had low levels of initial 
foreign bank participation. This suggests that the recovery in lending in those environments is due primarily to 
domestic banks. In countries with high levels of initial participation, the post-crisis dummy is insignificant, 
indicating no such rebound. Again, however, the positive significant coefficient for FOB share indicates that private 
credit levels are higher during both crisis and non-crisis periods (at least, that is, for countries with relatively stable 
foreign bank participation levels). In this sense, foreign bank participation can be viewed as a stabilizing influence 
on private credit levels.   26
than those that did not. Moreover, the timing of the increases indicates that foreign participation 
often increased in response to crises. However, post-crisis increases in foreign participation do 
not appear to be associated with improved provision of private credit. We hypothesize that this 
could be because recent foreign entrants tend to acquire distressed banks with loan portfolios in 
need of deep restructuring (i.e., write-offs). We cannot, however, rule out the possibility that the 
new entrants are simply poor intermediaries for the private sector. By contrast, countries with 
reasonably high and stable levels of foreign participation tend to have higher private credit levels 
than others before, during, and after crises. 
One might also expect that the competitive pressure stemming from stable foreign 
participation would enhance banking sector efficiency. To test that proposition, we tried 
regressions with two dependent variables: net interest margin and the ratio of overhead costs to 
total assets. We could uncover no robust relationships between those measures, foreign 
participation, and the occurrence of crisis. This might be because those measures are imperfect 
proxies for efficiency, especially in a cross-country context. It might also be that efficiency 
improvements take longer to manifest themselves, and thus our time period is too short to detect 
them. It seems likely, however, that the post-crisis effects of foreign participation on banking 
sector efficiency are best detected in detailed micro-level studies of individual countries. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper describes the recent trends in foreign bank ownership in developing countries, 
summarizes the existing evidence on the causes and implications of foreign bank presence and 
re-examines the link between banking crises and foreign bank participation. We find that foreign 
bank participation has risen strongly in two regions of the world: Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia and Latin America. Foreign bank presence has increased in Africa as well, but at a 
generally slower pace than in the other two regions. By contrast, foreign bank participation has 
remained stagnant or even declined in East and South Asia and in the Middle East and North 
Africa. 
  The literature on the drivers of foreign bank participation points to factors such as market 
opportunities, and cultural, regulatory and institutional similarities. In terms of the implications 
of foreign bank participation, the existing evidence suggests that foreign banks tend to foster 
efficiency and competition in the sector (except in cases of high banking concentration or when   27
restrictions on banking activities are present), and bolster banking sector stability, but may or 
may not improve access to credit. 
  Our empirical analysis shows that countries that experienced a banking crisis from 1995 
to 2002 tended to have higher levels of foreign bank participation than those that did not. 
Additional regressions indicate that foreign participation tended to increase as a result of crises 
rather than prior to them. However, those post-crisis increases in foreign participation did not 
coincide with improved provision of credit to the private sector. We speculate that this was 
because foreign entrants acquired distressed banks with a high share of loans that needed to be 
written off. By contrast, in countries where the level of foreign participation was relatively high 
and stable, private credit levels were significantly higher than in other countries before, during, 
and after crises.    28
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Table 1. Foreign Bank Participation in Developing Countries 1995-2002 
Table shows the share of assets (as a percentage of total banking sector assets) held by foreign banks 
  1995 1996  1997  1998  1999 2000 2001 2002 
DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES  18.1% 18.5%  21.2%  22.6%  24.5% 28.9% 30.5% 32.7% 
East Asia & Pacific  15.0%  14.5%  15.1%  14.6%  12.6%  8.2%  7.7%  11.7% 
Cambodia           8.5%  8.3%  7.9% 
China  0.0% 0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.2% 
Indonesia  4.4% 4.7%  5.8%  6.0%  3.0% 5.7% 4.1% 3.9% 
Korea,  Rep.  2.1% 2.1%  2.2%  5.0%  4.7% 7.6% 4.9% 9.2% 
Malaysia  24.9% 24.9%  25.0%  26.0%  23.1% 25.4% 22.7% 22.8% 
Mongolia         0.0%  7.1%  11.3%  45.3% 
Papua New Guinea  71.7%  67.0%  70.3%  63.9%  63.1%       
Philippines  7.9% 8.2%  8.5%  8.3%  8.6% 9.4% 9.8% 8.3% 
Thailand 7.2%  6.9%  7.1%  6.5%  10.2%  9.0%  7.3%  6.7% 
Vietnam  1.4% 1.8%  1.7%  1.0%  0.8% 1.0% 1.0% 0.9% 
Europe & Central Asia  13.0%  13.3%  14.7%  18.2%  21.1%  28.4%  32.7%  35.7% 
Albania           10.9%  15.6%  19.7% 
Armenia      17.6%  24.6%  34.9% 49.3% 60.1% 59.1% 
Azerbaijan  0.0% 0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 0.0% 0.0%   
Belarus  0.0% 0.0%  0.0%  7.2%  4.3% 3.8% 8.4% 9.5% 
Bosnia and Herzegovina    5.3%  6.5%  7.4% 12.4% 34.0% 46.1% 45.1% 
Bulgaria  8.2%  10.3%  10.3%  19.5%  30.9% 70.1% 55.5% 51.7% 
Croatia  9.8%  13.6%  14.1%  14.6%  15.8% 19.1% 20.6% 42.1% 
Czech Republic  14.2%  10.6%  13.7%  17.3% 31.0%  48.9% 61.4% 58.7% 
Estonia  80.7% 78.9%  72.1%  74.0%  73.5% 73.1% 73.0% 72.7% 
Georgia   10.6%  7.7%  6.4%  4.8%  20.0%  35.8%  36.2% 
Hungary  22.4% 23.1%  42.1%  62.9%  67.8% 63.5% 63.3% 58.7% 
Kazakhstan 12.6%  10.6%  15.8%  18.7%  18.6% 11.7% 12.6% 20.0% 
Kyrgyz Republic            30.3%  33.3%  20.8% 
Latvia  17.8% 30.4%  32.7%  35.3%  37.0% 37.6% 38.6% 38.8% 
Lithuania  18.9% 28.4%  35.5%  36.9%  41.8% 62.5% 92.2% 91.3% 
Macedonia,  FYR  28.4% 27.1%  25.8%  23.3%  23.6% 47.8% 43.8% 41.8% 
Moldova   1.6%  1.8%  1.8%  2.5%  7.9%  18.8%  18.3% 
Poland  3.7%  8.4% 13.8%  27.1%  34.1% 37.8% 50.7% 49.3% 
Romania  0.0%  0.2% 0.5%  12.9%  17.2% 25.9% 27.0% 26.5% 
Russian Federation  2.0%  1.4%  2.7% 2.1%  4.5%  11.5%  13.7% 15.6% 
Serbia and Montenegro            0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 
Slovak Republic  8.7%  11.9%  18.0%  20.4%  21.5% 54.6% 56.6% 81.5% 
Slovenia 6.8%  6.5%  6.4%  6.5%  6.1%  10.3%  14.3%  25.8% 
Turkey  0.4% 0.3%  0.3%  0.4%  0.5% 0.9% 1.8% 1.8% 
Ukraine  0.0% 0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  2.3% 5.8% 6.2% 6.8% 
Uzbekistan      0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 0.6% 0.6% 0.8% 
Latin America & Caribbean  19.3%  19.4%  24.3%  25.0%  25.4%  29.6%  30.2%  33.2% 
Antigua and Barbuda            0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 
Argentina  25.6% 28.1%  36.7%  40.0%  39.6% 47.8% 44.2% 37.5% 
Bolivia  42.7% 40.5%  39.7%  44.4%  44.2% 40.9% 39.4% 39.4% 
Brazil  9.0%  9.7% 14.4%  15.1%  17.3% 26.4% 30.4% 27.9% 
Chile  31.0% 35.3%  36.0%  37.6%  38.8% 38.4% 40.0% 44.8% 
Colombia  6.3%  10.9%  15.9%  18.0%  16.4% 25.8% 21.1% 17.4% 
Costa Rica  0.0%  0.2%  0.6%  5.1%  5.0%  18.0%  18.4%  18.8% 
Dominican  Republic  11.1% 10.8% 9.9% 2.0% 17.5% 16.2% 17.7% 17.5% 
Ecuador     26.0%  27.4%  28.2%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 
El Salvador  1.0%  1.8%  2.9%  8.3%  8.3%  13.6%  13.5%  14.2% 
Guatemala  6.0% 5.6%  6.1%  6.3%  7.0% 8.4% 8.6% 8.1% 
Guyana  0.0%  0.0% 24.7%  27.5%  26.7% 23.5% 23.6% 23.1% 
Haiti       0.0%  0.0%       
Honduras  2.3% 2.1%  2.1%  1.5%  1.5% 4.4% 5.0% 5.8% 
Jamaica  24.3% 21.2%  32.9%  35.8%  21.9% 18.9% 19.3% 50.3% 
Mexico 2.3%  4.3%  7.2%  7.5%  9.9%  28.5%  30.0%  61.9% 
Nicaragua  0.7% 1.4%  3.0%  3.9%  3.8% 5.1% 4.3% 4.4% 
Panama  59.7% 54.9%  51.5%  50.8%  48.4% 64.9% 64.2% 58.1% 
Paraguay  69.3% 56.2%  73.9%  76.8%  77.2% 79.9% 81.7% 83.3% 
Peru  51.7% 59.5%  63.1%  66.1%  64.8% 66.1% 66.7% 86.4% 
Trinidad and Tobago  14.0%  13.5%  16.2%  17.1%  17.7%  11.2%  10.4%  10.4% 
Uruguay  24.3% 14.2%  18.1%  24.4%  30.6% 91.8% 95.5% 94.5% 
Venezuela,  RB  4.8%  17.4%  29.1%  33.7%  34.3% 20.7% 30.2% 26.6% 
Data source: Micco, Panizza, and Yañez (2006) 
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Table 1. Foreign Bank Participation in Developing Countries 1995-2002 (cont.) 
Table shows the share of assets (as a percentage of total banking sector assets) held by foreign banks 
  1995 1996  1997  1998  1999 2000 2001 2002 
Middle East & North Africa  11.9%  12.3%  12.5%  12.8%  12.8%  14.4%  15.9%  18.8% 
Algeria           59.0%  67.5%  60.0% 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  4.0%  6.0%  6.1%  6.1%  6.2%  6.9%  6.4%  7.1% 
Iran, Islamic Rep.            0.0%  0.0%   
Jordan  12.8% 12.4%  12.9%  12.8%  12.8% 13.5% 13.7% 13.3% 
Lebanon  29.6% 29.4%  29.4%  31.5%  31.2% 30.5% 28.9% 28.0% 
Libya           0.0%  0.0%   
Morocco  18.6% 19.3%  19.5%  19.8%  20.4% 16.9% 17.3% 16.4% 
Oman  0.0% 0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 0.0% 8.0% 8.7% 
Tunisia  10.8% 11.0%  11.5%  11.7%  11.9% 12.1% 14.9% 14.8% 
Yemen,  Rep.  7.3% 7.8%  8.2%  8.0%  7.3% 5.0% 2.0% 2.4% 
South Asia  8.6%  9.4%  9.7%  9.3%  9.4%  12.0%  10.9%  10.4% 
Bangladesh  0.0% 0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
India  0.9% 1.1%  1.3%  1.3%  1.3% 1.7% 1.4% 0.5% 
Nepal  38.9% 41.7%  42.0%  39.4%  40.0% 52.8% 46.7% 45.4% 
Pakistan  1.4% 1.5%  2.3%  2.4%  2.4% 3.4% 4.3% 6.0% 
Sri  Lanka  2.2% 2.5%  3.1%  3.2%  3.3% 2.3% 2.4% 0.3% 
Sub-Saharan Africa  30.2%  28.7%  32.4% 33.1%  37.4%  45.3% 45.3% 45.0% 
Angola             38.1%  43.0% 
Benin   49.4%  48.2%  46.0%  46.0%    51.8%  53.1% 
Botswana  79.6% 79.5%  79.7%  80.7%  83.0% 84.2% 84.7% 84.0% 
Burkina  Faso        44.4%  43.8% 24.4% 29.4% 30.4% 
Burundi  39.2% 37.3%  37.6%  37.2%  36.4% 16.2% 23.6% 21.5% 
Cameroon      65.4%  64.0%  63.9% 54.9% 56.7% 59.0% 
Cote d'Ivoire  20.3%  19.7%  20.0%  23.8%  53.6% 58.3% 62.8% 61.8% 
Ethiopia  0.0% 0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Ghana  28.4% 29.9%  53.8%  53.9%  57.6% 64.7% 52.1% 52.8% 
Kenya  26.6% 27.6%  27.6%  29.4%  28.6% 31.6% 34.4% 36.0% 
Lesotho           84.9%  86.1%  86.3% 
Madagascar  42.3%        63.3% 62.1% 61.4% 62.0% 
Malawi   8.9%  8.2%  8.1%  8.9%  33.7%  27.5%  27.9% 
Mali  41.1% 41.3%  40.6%  40.3%  40.8% 57.6% 49.9% 48.9% 
Mauritius 9.5%  19.7%  22.5%  32.8% 42.4%  24.6% 25.3% 24.7% 
Mozambique    22.0%  38.4%  40.6%  44.8% 60.0% 72.2% 72.5% 
Namibia  45.2% 42.6%  35.5%  33.8%  35.3% 47.4% 68.6% 66.9% 
Niger           51.0%  51.1%  43.7% 
Nigeria  10.1% 10.1%  10.1%  9.5% 12.5% 15.0% 10.5% 11.2% 
Rwanda   22.4%  22.8%  21.1%  23.7%      
Senegal    43.1%  42.5%  42.6%  42.8% 42.3% 40.9% 39.1% 
Seychelles   12.6%  13.1%  13.6%  13.8%       
Sierra Leone      0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  31.6%  32.2%  29.5% 
South Africa  0.3%  0.2%  0.2%  0.2%  0.2%  11.4%  10.4%  10.8% 
Sudan  0.0% 0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 3.0% 2.9% 4.7% 
Swaziland           79.1%  74.7%  71.1% 
Tanzania    26.0%  31.5%  31.5%  34.6% 63.5% 64.3% 64.3% 
Uganda  39.7% 38.5%  36.3%  69.8%  76.0% 53.8% 53.9% 55.4% 
Zambia  55.2% 52.9%  93.6%  57.2%  61.1% 69.7% 68.4% 66.6% 
Zimbabwe  45.8% 46.9%  49.8%  47.3%  58.2% 51.5% 33.8% 33.3% 
Data source: Micco, Panizza, and Yañez (2006) 
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Table 2: Banking Crises and Costs  
Country Crisis  Period 
Cost of the Crisis  
(% GDP) 
East Asia & Pacific 
China 1990-1999    
Indonesia 1992-1995  2.0% 
Indonesia 1997-2003  55.0% 
Korea, Rep  1997-2002  28.0% 
Laos 1997  1.5% 
Malaysia 1997-2003  16.4% 
Myanmar 1996-1997     
Philippines 1997-2002  7.0% 
Thailand 1997-2002  34.8% 
Vietnam 1997-2002     
Eastern Europe & Central Asia 
Albania 1992-1996    
Armenia 1994-1996    
Azerbaijan 1995    
Belarus 1995    
Bosnia and Herzegovina  1992-2003    
Bulgaria 1995-1997  13.0% 
Croatia 1996     
Czech Republic  1991-1995  12.0% 
Estonia 1992-1995  1.4% 
Georgia  1991-1996    
Hungary 1991-1995  10.0% 
Kyrgyz Republic  1990-1999    
Latvia* 1995-2003  10.0% 
Lithuania 1995-1996     
Poland 1990-1999  2.0% 
Romania 1990-2003     
Russian Federation  1995    
Russian Federation  1998-1999  5% - 7% 
Slovak Republic  1991-2003  15.0% 
Tajikistan 1996     
Turkey 1991     
Turkey 1994-1995  1.0% 
Turkey 2000-2003  30.5% 
Ukraine 1997-1998     
       Source: Caprio and Klingebiel (2003), Honohan and Klingebiel (2003) 
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Table 2: Banking Crises and Costs 
Country Crisis  Period 
Cost of the Crisis 
 (% GDP) 
Latin America & Caribbean 
Argentina 1995-1997  2.0% 
Argentina 2000-2003  2.0% 
Bolivia 2001-2002     
Bolivia 1994-1997     
Brazil 1990     
Brazil 1994-1999  13.2% 
Colombia 1999-2000  5.0% 
Costa Rica  1994-1997    
Ecuador 1995-2003  20.0% 
Guyana 1993-1995     
Jamaica 1994-2000  44.0% 
Mexico 1994-1997  19.3% 
Nicaragua 1985-1996     
Paraguay 1995-1999  13.0% 
Uruguay 2002-2003  3.0% 
Venezuela, RB  1993-1997  18%* 
Middle East & North Africa 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  1991-1995  0.5% 
Tunisia 1991-1996     
Yemen, Rep.  1996    
South Asia 
Bangladesh   1985-1996    
India 1991-1997     
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Angola 1991-2003    
Botswana 1994-1995     
Burundi 1994-1997     
Cameroon 1995-1998     
Cape Verde  1993-1996    
Central African Republic  1976-1999    
Congo, Rep.  1992-2003    
Ethiopia 1994-1995     
Gabon 1995     
Ghana 1997-2002  6%** 
Guinea-Bissau 1994-1997    
Kenya 1992-1997     
Mauritius 1996     
Mozambique 1987-1997     
Nigeria 1990-1999     
Sierra Leone  1990-2003    
Swaziland 1995     
Tanzania 1985-1999     
Togo 1993-1995     
Uganda 1994-2003     
Zambia 1995  14.0% 
Zimbabwe 1995-2003     
Note: * From 1994 to 1995, ** % of GNP 
Source: Caprio and Klingebiel (2003), Honohan and Klingebiel (2003)   36
 
Table 3: Average Budget to GDP Before and After Crises 
Region 
Average Budget Deficit to 
GDP 3 years before 
Average Budget Deficit to 
GDP 3 years after 
East Asia & Pacific  0.20%  -1.24% 
Eastern Europe & Central Asia  -3.94%  -4.18% 
Latin America & Caribbean  -3.94%  -3.17% 
Middle East & North Africa  -7.08%  -2.34% 
South Asia   -7.55%  -5.95% 
Sub-Saharan Africa  -2.88%  -3.64% 
   Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank) and International Financial Statistics (IMF) 
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East Asia & Pacific   
   Crises countries   3.5 
   Non-crises countries   3.21 
Eastern Europe & Central Asia   
   Crises countries  3.02 
    Non-crises countries  3.56 
Latin America & Caribbean   
   Crises countries  2.72 
   Non-crises countries  2.79 
Middle East & North Africa   
   Crises countries  3.25 
   Non-crises countries  3.47 
South Asia   
   Crises countries   3.81 
   Non-crises countries  2.88 
Sub-Saharan Africa   
   Crises countries  3.18 
   Non-crises countries  3.6 
 * Index developed by the Heritage Foundation with values from 1 to 5 where higher 
values indicate greater restrictions. 
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Table 5 
Cross-Country Regressions for the Percentage Change in Foreign Bank Participation  
1995 to 2002  
E x p l a n a t o r y  V a r i a b l e s 1 234567 8
Banking Crisis 0.1126 0.1114 0.1000 0.0745 0.1045 0.1168 0.0921 0.0777
[2.24]** [2.16]** [2.02]** [1.58] [2.31]** [2.30]** [2.16]** [1.70]*
Inflation 0.0006 0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0008 0.0004 0.0004 -0.0009 -0.0009
[1.12] [1.09] [1.14] [1.18] [0.78] [0.68] [1.30] [1.28]
GDP Growth 0.0109 0.0109 0.0122 0.0123 0.0086 0.0088 0.0108 0.0111
[2.57]** [2.45]** [2.88]*** [2.83]*** [1.78]* [1.82]* [2.34]** [2.42]**
Banking Index -0.0571 -0.0574 0.0059 0.0075 -0.0760 -0.0789 -0.0208 -0.0156
[1.27] [1.26] [0.15] [0.21] [1.63] [1.68]* [0.50] [0.38]
Property Rights 0.0215 0.0224 -0.0212 -0.0092 0.0208 0.0136 -0.0185 -0.0113
[0.61] [0.61] [0.66] [0.30] [0.59] [0.39] [0.60] [0.38]
Log average GDP 95-02 (Constant GDP) 0.0006 0.0274 -0.0160 0.0156
[0.04] [1.48] [0.98] [0.94]
Base Foreign Owned Bank Share (95-96) -0.2398 -0.2959 -0.2722 -0.2298
[1.64] [1.83]* [1.86]* [1.62]
Dummy (East Asia& Pacific) -0.2699 -0.3393 -0.3050 -0.3386
[2.81]*** [2.93]*** [3.50]*** [3.41]***
Dummy (Europe and Central Asia) 0.1263 0.1008 0.0755 0.0691
[1.93]* [1.44] [1.02] [0.92]
Dummy (Latin America & Caribbean) 0.0199 -0.0128 -0.0277 -0.0372
[0.31] [0.20] [0.38] [0.51]
Dummy (Middle East and North Africa) -0.1174 -0.1513 -0.1741 -0.1848
[2.26]** [2.83]*** [3.04]*** [3.13]***
Dummy (South Asia) -0.1089 -0.1723 -0.1649 -0.1927
[1.79]* [2.22]** [2.13]** [2.20]**
Constant 0.1614 0.1464 0.1480 -0.4926 0.2698 0.6823 0.3112 -0.0801
[1.61] [0.39] [1.52] [1.11] [2.21]** [1.57] [2.51]** [0.20]
Observations 78 77 78 77 78 77 78 77
R - s q u a r e d 0 . 1 3 0 . 1 20 . 3 60 . 3 90 . 1 70 . 1 80 . 4 1 0 . 4 2
Robust t statistics in brackets, *, ** and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent.   
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Table 6 
Regressions with Country Fixed Effects for the Share of Banking Sector Assets Held by Foreign Banks 
 
Explanatory Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Banking Crisis -0.067 -0.058 -0.024 -0.022 0.059 0.018 0.000 -0.035
[4.41]*** [4.63]*** [1.80]* [1.85]* [1.90]* [0.74] [0.01] [1.52]
Post-Crisis 0.094 0.075 0.032 0.019
[6.85]*** [5.73]*** [2.41]** [1.43]
Inflation -0.024 -0.043 -0.002 -0.001
[1.76]* [3.38]*** [4.85]*** [3.32]***
GDP Growth 0.014 -0.034 -0.003 -0.001
[1.26] [2.97]*** [1.87]* [0.80]
Banking Index -0.002 -0.001 -0.025 -0.042
   [5.11]*** [3.22]*** [1.86]* [3.34]***
Property Rights -0.003 -0.001 0.011 -0.034
   [2.06]** [0.60] [1.04] [3.01]***
Dummy 1996 0.001 -0.008 -0.001 -0.007
[0.09] [0.51] [0.08] [0.45]
Dummy 1997 0.029 0.019 0.024 0.022
[2.03]** [1.22] [1.57] [1.35]
Dummy 1998 0.043 0.027 0.037 0.029
[3.12]*** [1.66]* [2.50]** [1.78]*
Dummy 1999 0.059 0.045 0.053 0.048
 [4.38]*** [2.88]*** [3.59]*** [2.99]***
Dummy 2000 0.107 0.104 0.1 0.104
[7.34]*** [6.38]*** [6.24]*** [5.98]***
Dummy 2001 0.12 0.12 0.113 0.123
[7.77]*** [6.79]*** [6.70]*** [6.61]***
Dummy 2002 0.134 0.134 0.126 0.135
[7.67]*** [7.05]*** [7.35]*** [6.84]***
Constant 0.274 0.338 0.197 0.451 0.193 0.292 0.185 0.455
[46.13]*** [6.99]*** [16.45]*** [8.61]*** [10.62]*** [5.97]*** [10.28]*** [8.32]***
Observations 713 640 713 640 713 647 713 647
Number of countries 102 99 102 99 102 99 102 99
R-squared 0.04 0.13 0.25 0.32 0.09 0.14 0.25 0.31
Robust t statistics in brackets, *, ** and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent.   40
Table 7 
Regressions with Country Fixed Effects:  
Dependent Variable, Credit to the Private Sector/GDP 
E x p l a n a t o r y  V a r i a b l e s 12345678
Banking Crisis 0.048 0.045 0.045 0.043
[1.77]* [1.64] [1.69]* [1.56]
Post-Crisis 0.046 0.047 0.038 0.040 0.043 0.045 0.037 0.039
[3.56]*** [3.35]*** [2.97]*** [2.92]*** [3.18]*** [3.10]*** [2.85]*** [2.82]***
FOB Share 0.086 0.069 0.127 0.122 0.064 0.056 0.121 0.117
[2.49]** [2.02]** [3.35]*** [3.03]*** [1.82]* [1.59] [3.13]*** [2.88]***
FOB x Post-Crisis -0.094 -0.094 -0.208 -0.214 -0.084 -0.085 -0.202 -0.208
[2.79]*** [2.74]*** [3.82]*** [3.83]*** [2.49]** [2.46]** [3.68]*** [3.69]***
Initial FOB x Post-Crisis 0.202 0.209 0.198 0.205
[3.62]*** [3.68]*** [3.53]*** [3.59]***
Inflation 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.23] [0.32] [0.91] [0.40] [0.63] [0.14] [0.79] [0.30]
GDP growth -0.003 -0.003
[3.54]*** [3.22]***
Banking Index 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
[0.37] [0.23] [0.36] [0.31] [0.29] [0.26] [0.27] [0.24]
Property Rights -0.016 -0.016 -0.014 -0.014 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015
[2.01]** [2.01]** [1.79]* [1.76]* [1.92]* [1.87]* [1.89]* [1.85]*
Concentration -0.090 -0.063 -0.059 -0.058
[2.41]** [1.81]* [1.67]* [1.65]
Constant 0.282 0.352 0.267 0.313 0.258 0.303 0.245 0.288
[9.39]*** [7.99]*** [9.14]*** [7.34]*** [7.65]*** [6.49]*** [7.38]*** [6.13]***
Observations 559 541 554 536 554 536 554 536
N u m b e r  o f  c o u n t r i e s 7 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 9
R-squared 0.09 0.1 0.1 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.12
Robust t statistics in brackets, *, ** and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent.     41
  Table 8 
Split-Sample Tests, Regressions with Country Fixed Effects 
Dependent Variable, Credit to the Private Sector/GDP 
 
1234
Banking Crisis -0.006 0.054
[0.35] [1.73]*
Post-Crisis 0.022 0.022 0.067 0.067
[0.85] [0.84] [3.84]*** [3.85]***
FOB Share 0.12 0.121 0.102 0.098
[2.79]*** [2.68]*** [1.51] [1.45]
FOB x Post-Crisis -0.224 -0.225 -0.14 -0.126
[3.16]*** [3.11]*** [1.55] [1.38]
Initial FOB x Post-Crisis 0.233 0.234 -0.663 -0.752
[3.27]*** [3.23]*** [1.21] [1.30]
Inflation -0.001 -0.001 0 0
[3.34]*** [3.28]*** [0.83] [0.83]
GDP growth -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003
[1.25] [1.25] [2.82]*** [2.39]**
Banking Index -0.016 -0.016 0.022 0.022
[2.18]** [2.18]** [1.87]* [1.86]*
Property Rights 0.013 0.013 -0.03 -0.033
[1.17] [1.17] [2.62]*** [2.73]***
Concentration -0.067 -0.066 -0.053 -0.035
[1.37] [1.36] [1.07] [0.69]
Constant 0.271 0.274 0.328 0.29
[5.93]*** [6.04]*** [4.82]*** [3.96]***
Observations 285 285 251 251
Number of countries 43 43 36 36
R-squared 0.2 0.2 0.13 0.15
Robust t statistics in brackets, *, ** and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent. 
Explanatory Variables
Sample Sample 
Initial FOB>=10% Initial FOB<10%
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Figure 2: Foreign Bank Participation Across Regions Following Banking Crises 
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    Data source: Micco, Panizza, and Yañez (2006) 
 